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1 Background of the evaluation 
1.1 Contextualized need for the evaluation 
Despite widespread research activities in conflict-affected areas around the world, 
there has been limited attention paid to the actual process, methods and challenges of 
conducting research in these contexts. There is substantial literature on research 
methods in general, but little addresses the ethical and methodological challenges of 
carrying out research in societies experiencing violent conflict. Yet, researchers 
working in such circumstances often face difficulties connecting with the mainstream 
research community and do not receive adapted support, in terms of research design 
and ethics, required by these specific contexts. 
 
For over a decade, through its Peace, Conflict and Development Program (PCD), 
IDRC has supported applied research and capacity-building on peace and conflict 
research in Latin America and the Caribbean, in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East 
and South Asia, – often with a view to advance global norms and learning on cross-
regional analysis of peace and conflict processes. 
 
IDRC works in partnership with institutes, universities, policymakers, civil society 
organizations, as well as networks of researchers. Recognizing the non-linearity of 
conflict, and the complexity of conflict situations and peace dynamics, IDRC aims at 
proactively impacting these situations through its support to applied research and 
policy-influence. PCD is a thematically focused research program that remains 
responsive to the priorities of Southern partners and also seeks to develop south-south 
research programs and networks. The four broad thematic areas covered by PCD are 
the following: 
 Democratic Processes in Governance and Peacebuilding;  
 Political Economy of Peace and Conflict;  
 Security and Insecurity; 
 Violence, Trauma, Justice and Reconciliation.  
 
IDRC is now preparing its Corporate Strategy and Program Framework 2010-2015.  
 
Specific context for Palestine 
 
Palestine has been in a state of conflict for most of the past 60 years. For the past 41 
years the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) have been under Israeli Occupation. In 
addition, the past 2 years have seen an unprecedented internal split at the political and 
civil society level that has brought in another level to the conflict.  
 
The second Intifada led to a catastrophic deterioration in the humanitarian situation in 
the WBGS: Palestinians have experienced a drastic decline in living standards and a 
rise in poverty, high rates of unemployment, social disintegration, absence of social 
and personal security and political chaos. The Israeli measures of closure, siege, 




sites, the continued building of the Separation Barrier and expansion of settlements as 
well as bypass roads have produced a society that is confronted with all types of 
conflict on a daily basis. These measures affect every aspect of Palestinian life.  The 
internal political fighting between Hamas and Fatah in the wake of Hamas’ electoral 
victory in 2006 and later the de facto coup of the Gaza Strip by Hamas in June 2007 
have also played a negative role in what is already a catastrophic situation.  
 
Research capacity in Palestine is existent and there are a multitude of research 
institutes and initiatives, which employ highly qualified social scientists. IDRC has 
been supporting a number of partner organisations in Palestine since 1984, with more 
than 80 projects funded, spending more than CAD $12,000,000. Since the year 2000, 
the most significant area of programming has fallen under the umbrella of the PCD 
program initiative. The projects range from conflict analyses to improving policy 
research capacity, examining the impact of the violent conflict on Palestinian 
adolescents, as well as examining the possibility of integrating Islamist militants into 
the political process. The underlying two main aims of the PCD support to research in 
Palestine has been the creation of conditions in knowledge to return to a viable peace 
process, as well as to contribute to the Palestinian state-building process. 1 
 
Despite the fact that programming and project delivery has at times been very 
problematic due to the ongoing conflict, funding has never been withheld or stopped. 
Incorporating Palestine as one of the case studies in this evaluation is essential in order 
to understand the particular way in which the Palestinian partners have coped with 
these difficulties throughout the research cycle, and how IDRC has adapted its 
programming modalities to accommodate the difficult realities facing their Palestinian 
partners on the ground. 
 
This study covers the period of 2002 when the first project, PACT I, covered by this 
study was commenced until the present day, as 2 of the projects are still ongoing. 
1.2 Intended users and uses 
According to IDRC's Evaluation Guidelines, "an evaluation user is one who has the 
‘willingness’, ‘authority’, and ‘ability’ to put learnings from the evaluation process or 
evaluation findings to work in some way. The primary intended users are those 
particular individuals or groups who are affected by the outcome of the evaluation, 
are in a position to make decisions about the evaluation, and intend to use the 
evaluation process or findings to inform their decisions or actions."2 
  
The intended users of this evaluation are PCD program staff (primary intended users), 
IDRC senior management, IDRC program staff and PCD’s partners (secondary users). 
The audience3 of the evaluation also include other agencies/donors working in conflict 
contexts. 
 
1 Debriefing in Ottawa, 29-31 April, 2008 
2 IDRC, "Identifying the Intended User(s) of an Evaluation", Evaluation Guidelines, p1. 
3 "It is important to distinguish between the intended audience and the user(s) of an evaluation. 





The evaluation seeks4 to improve PCD's programming approach (project and program 
identification and development, programming modalities, monitoring, reporting and 
evaluation) in contexts of active conflict where PCD already programs. Building on 
lessons learnt from previous and current programming experience, it also assesses 
how, when, and under what conditions PCD could expand programming. 
 
The evaluation also aims at increasing PCD partners' understanding of the value, 
utility and reach that research might have in contexts of conflict, as well as clarifying 
PCD and IDRC’s role, and the expectations of what PCD and IDRC can and cannot do 
to support partners in conflict contexts. 
 
1.3 Objectives and evaluation questions 
As stated in the revised Terms of Reference (ToR)5, the main objective of this 
evaluation is to identify the factors (conditions and programming modalities) that 
facilitate or hinder the research process for PCD-supported projects in countries and 
regions affected by violent conflict, and the advantages and disadvantages of PCD 
programming modalities in achieving PCD objectives in those conflict settings.  
 
This evaluation is not an accountability evaluation, but should be considered as a 
learning exercise. Four specific objectives guide the evaluation which focuses on:  
 
1) The Conflict Context: Get a better understanding of what conditions (security, 
research infrastructure, community of researchers, etc.) need to be in place, 
especially when a return to violence seems imminent, so that 1) PCD can feasibly 
support research and 2) partners can feasibly conduct research in line with PCD’s 
program objectives. Each case study, here Palestine, outlines the actual 
conditions the researchers are working in and sheds light on lessons learnt.  
 
2) “What Happened” - the Partners’ and PCD’s Intents and Achievements: 
Build a body of learning around the contributions PCD supported research can 
make in influencing policy, building research capacities, and increase domestic 
ownership of peace processes when taking into account the prevailing 
environmental conditions surrounding the research process and ethical 
considerations.  
 
3) The “How”- Programming Modalities: Increase learning around the strengths 
and weaknesses of PCD programming modalities and its relationships to its 
research partners in contributing to the achievement of PCD objectives in 
countries and regions affected by violent conflict. 
react to an evaluation. The audience is interested in the evaluation but has a more passive 
relationship with it than the primary intended user(s)."Ibid. 
4 For more details on the intended uses of the evaluation, see ToR here attached, p 31. 
5 The ToR have been adjusted following the methodological workshop that was held in Ottawa 





4) Forward Thinking: With a better understanding of prevailing conditions, 
challenges and opportunities surrounding PCD supported research as well as 
PCD’s programming modalities: explore the implications (in terms of resources, 
security, institutional risks, policy influence, how we partner, etc.) of potential 
expansion of PCD programming into countries and regions affected by violent 
conflict.  
 
1.4 Values and principles guiding the evaluation process 
This evaluation is guided by the international recognized standards for evaluation 
quality, which include impartiality, independence, credibility, transparency and 
usefulness. The evaluation has been conducted under the standards of ethics for social 
science research (e.g guaranteeing the integrity of data or ensuring that there is no 
conflict of interest with the evaluator).  
 
Given the complexity and high sensitivity of the conflict context, the evaluation has 
been conducted from a conflict-sensitive approach, at two different levels: 
 First, attention has been paid to the interaction between the evaluation process 
itself and the research process, and/or context: e.g the possibility of visiting 
communities involved in the research project has always been assessed 
together with the researchers, trusting their judgement call on the negative 
unintended effects it could have on the research process itself. In the case of 
Palestine, a field visit for the Phase III of PACT (Palestinian Adolescents 
Coping with Trauma) to talk with the respondents in the villages where the 
study is being conducted was originally planned. However, as a phasing out 
on the behalf of ICHP was ongoing in order for the community based 
rehabilitation centre to take charge, a fleeting visit by the centre might have 
had negative consequences on the perceived ownership of the CBO. The visit 
was therefore cancelled.     
 Secondly, the evaluation examines the interaction of the research process with 
the context setting, including policy influence, but also unintended negative 
and positive effects of the research process. 
 
As stated in the guiding principles of IDRC's Evaluation Unit, the "evaluation should 
be an asset for those being evaluated. Evaluation can impose a considerable time and 
resource burden on partner organizations (...)"6. Whereas this evaluation does not aim 
to evaluate IDRC's partner organizations against results and is strictly orientated 
towards learning, the process required time from their staff and from the researchers. 
The evaluation team has taken this parameter into account when it has planned and 
conducted the field visit.  
 
 





In Palestine, the field trip unfortunately coincided with summer holidays which meant 
that some key members of the research teams for the projects covered by this study 
were not present. However, in such cases, information was shared via email and 






2.1 Case study approach  
According to Robert Yin (2003), “a case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. In other 
words, you would use the case study method because you deliberately wanted to cover 
contextual conditions – believing that they might be highly pertinent to your 
phenomenon of study” 7.  
 
This report reflects the findings of the Palestine country case study. Through a detailed 
contextual analysis of four IDRC funded research projects, this case study aims to 
understand what is achievable in contexts which are similar to the Palestinian one. The 
evaluation particularly examines if the goals/objectives of the selected projects have 
been or are hampered or enhanced by the context in which they are being carried out.   
 
The selected projects are: 
 
Project 101610 – Between State and Tribe: The Rule of Law and Dispute 
Settlement in Post-Oslo  
 
Partner: Dr. Mudar Kassis, Institute of Law, Birzeit University (hereby known as the 
Rule of Law Project) 
 
The overall aim of this project was to produce policy recommendations on the role of 
customary law in the present and future Palestinian justice system8. This project 
investigated the tensions between the formal and the informal justice systems in 
Palestine and formulated policy recommendations, based on the findings of the 
research, on how these two potentially conflicting systems can be reconciled in a 
future Palestinian judiciary, whether by integrating the two, or encouraging the reform 
of one or both systems.  
 
While the end objective of this research project was to contribute to efforts to reform 
the judiciary by recommending ways to approach the plurality of the Palestinian 
justice system, the primary and secondary research that was undertaken and the 
publication that resulted were equally important, as they have provided new insight 




7 Yin, Robert K. (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd ed., Applied social research 
methods series, vol.5, London: Sage Publications, p13.. 
8 Second Interim Technical Report, Informal Justice: The Rule of Law and Dispute Resolution in 




Project 102990 – Strategic Consequences of Palestine Divisions AND Project 
103849 – Integrating Islamist Militants into the Political Process  
 
 
Partner: Khalil Shikaki, Director, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 
(PSR) 
 
Strategic Consequences of Palestine Divisions (hereby know as the Young Guards 
project) 
The main objectives of this project was to review current Palestinian domestic and 
strategic policy choices and likely future scenarios while developing a better 
understanding of the socio-political changes that led to existing divisions and 
particularly the emergence of the young guard (within Fatah); and to examine the 
process of leadership transition within the Palestinian nationalist movement outlining 
the nature, profile, and outlook of the emerging young leadership. The project aimed 
to propose strategies to deal with potential consequences of the current Palestinian 
divisions on the domestic scene and the future of the peace process.   
 
 
Integrating Islamist Militants into the Political Process (hereby known as the Hamas 
project)This project is co-funded by the Middle East Good Governance Fund 
(MEGGF)9.   
  
 
The main question that this, still ongoing, project aims to answer is if the integration 
of Hamas into the political process will serve to moderate the group and bring it closer 
to mainstream social attitudes and policies. The project aims to examine the new 
dynamics within Hamas from three perspectives: political governance, social 
processes and the peace process - as well as attempting to map the hierarchy of the 
movement both in Palestine and abroad.  
 
Projects 101323, 103302, 104728 – Palestinian Adolescents Coping with Trauma 
(PACT) (Phase I, II, III)  
 
Partner: Dr. Rita Giacaman (Phase II, III, III), Associate Professor and Director, 
Institute for Community and Public Health (ICPH), Birzeit University, and Yoke van 
der Meulen-Rabaia (Phase III), PhD Candidate and Researcher, ICPH, Birzeit 
University 
 
The Palestinian Adolescents Coping with Trauma (PACT) started in 2002 as a two 
year project examining the effect of armed conflict, military occupation and other 
sources of local violence on Palestinian youth. It was a collaboration between the 
Social Program Evaluation Group at Queen’s University in Canada and the Institute 
                                                            
9 The Middle East Good Governance Fund (http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-119658-201-1-
DO_TOPIC.html) focuses on the role of civil society and political parties in influencing policy 
processes, with a focus on Islamist political parties and civil society. 
9 
 
for Community Public Health (ICPH) at Birzeit University in Palestine. The project 
has since gone through phase II which incorporated a communal perspective of 
community psycho-social and mental health into existing Community Based 
Rehabilitation (CBR) initiatives to create a Community Psycho-Social and Mental 
Health (CPMH) focus for youth. PACT is currently in phase III which aims to expand 
and elaborate on the model of internal community support which was developed in 
phase II. The PACT project addresses a central component of conflict, namely the 
destructive psycho-social effects of violence and the need to assess and address the 
mental health consequences of extended violent conflict.  
 
It was suggested in the Inception Report that all the pre-selected PCD projects in 
Palestine would be covered as most of the partners and researchers were concentrated 
in Ramallah in Palestine and two of the selected projects have the same partner and 
three projects are phases of the same project. However, Amjad Atallah from Strategic 
Assessments (SAI) in Washington who was the partner for Project 102737 – Third 
Party Intervention could not be reached at any point during the evaluation and the 
contact details for his partner Jarat Chopra was only received at a very late stage of the 
process and a mutually suitable time to discuss the project could unfortunately not be 
agreed on time. This project has therefore regrettably not been included in this final 
report. 
2.2 Sources and data collection method 
Data for this study was collected from numerous sources such as IDRC and partner 
project documentation, through semi-structured interviews with the researchers 
involved in the projects either face-to-face in Palestine or over the phone. Discussions 
were also held with current and past PCD staff. Unfortunately it was not possible to 
speak to the objects of the research in Palestine, but this has not caused a gap in the 
findings for the successful completion of this study. 
10 
 
3 Evaluation findings 
 
3.1 On the Conflict Context 
Nature of the Conflict 
The four projects covered by this study have all been conducted during a period of 
heightened insecurity and instability in Palestine, both due to the start of the second 
intifada in the fall of 2000 and due to the death of Yasir Arafat in late 2004 and the 
mounting internal tension between the different Palestinian factions that has followed. 
Although the different constraints and complications arising from the reoccupation of 
the West Bank by Israel has been part of daily life for all the partners and researchers 
involved in the PCD supported projects, the intensity of the occupation has varied 
significantly throughout the period.  
Although Ramallah and its surrounding villages have not been as dramatically 
exposed to the Israeli aggressive measures compared to other Palestinian areas, the 
impact of the overall situation, particularly the closure of roads and siege have at times 
made life extremely difficult for the population. Infrastructure and basic services may 
not have been suspended completely, but they were interrupted, especially during the 
siege and reoccupation of Ramallah and other areas in the West Bank in 2002. Periods 
of apparent calm could change into chaos in a matter of hours and crucial roads 
linking cities to each other could be blocked or unblocked from one day to the other. 
In January 2006 the instability in Palestine was given a new twist when Hamas won 
the Palestinians legislative elections. This electoral victory led to further deterioration 
as the consequence of the democratic election led to an international boycott of the PA 
now controlled by Hamas. After experiencing fierce fighting between Fatah and 
Hamas in Gaza during late 2006, negotiations took place in order to find peaceful 
means of solving the internal Palestinian discord. In March 2007 Fatah and Hamas 
decided to establish the first Palestinian National Unity Government. However, its life 
span was brief and in June new internal Palestinian fighting causing at least 300 deaths 
and more than 700 wounded broke out in the Gaza Strip. Since then Hamas has 
complete control over the Gaza Strip, while Fatah is in control in the West Bank. The 
current period is therefore characterised by the strife between Fatah and Hamas, as 
well as the rifts within the Fatah movement, as these have since become much more 
evident.  
For a full description of the Palestinian conflict context for the period under review, 
please refer to Annex 2. 
Effects on the research process 
All the projects were faced with the physical effects of the occupation – some more 




from Ramallah to Birzeit University where the ICPH office was then located was 
closed for long periods and project staff was forced to work from make-shift offices at 
home in Ramallah using laptops and mobile phones to communicate with each-other. 
Checkpoints and restricted mobility were nuisances for all the researchers but not an 
environment that those involved are not familiar with. Solutions such as having field 
teams stay in villages for longer periods of time and using local field researchers based 
in the areas surveyed were adopted when necessary in order to avoid having to cross 
difficult checkpoints several times a day and for the research or surveying to be more 
efficient10. 
One of the biggest physical constraints for all the projects covered was the inability to 
travel to Gaza due to Israeli travel bans, throughout the duration of the projects.  The 
State and Tribe project suffered in quality because of the lack of face-to-face meeting 
with the fieldworkers in the strip. The supervisors in Birzeit found that although the 
fieldworkers were generally responsive to the comments and requests of the 
supervisors, the fieldwork team in Gaza produced work that was of a much lower 
standard than the work done by the Ramallah/Jerusalem and Nablus teams11. Although 
tele- and video conferencing facilities were used whenever possible, they were not as 
effective as face-to-face meetings.  Similarly, ICPH could not carry out a survey for 
the PACT project in Gaza, despite initially planning to do so12. 
Whereas the effects of the Israeli occupation on the research could to some extent be 
mitigated by being flexible in terms of scope and resourceful in terms of movement, 
communication and dissemination strategies, the effects of the internal political strife 
and the de facto coup in Gaza by Hamas could not have been foreseen neither by the 
partners nor IDRC and provisions for difficulties arising from this change in the 
conflict dynamic was therefore not counted for in the project plans.  
While both the Young Guards and the Hamas project by PSR have been affected in 
scope by the inability to travel to Gaza, the major affect has been the internal political 
strife, and particularly by the Hamas take-over of Gaza in the summer of 2006. For the 
Young Guards project it suddenly became impossible to get any statistics on Fatah in 
Gaza as the movement largely went underground and the supporters of the secular 
nationalist party were under persecution. Similarly, since Hamas won the Palestinian 
Parliamentary elections in March 2006, most of the Hamas leaders in the West Bank 
have been imprisoned by Israel meaning that only Hamas elites in Gaza have been 
extensively interviewed for the project.   
Although the proposal for the Hamas project had been re-formulated together with 
IDRC to reflect the new situation on the ground after the January 2006 elections, it 
would not have been possible to factor in all the possible problems that were to arise 
in the two years following. According to PSR, adaptation in both projects was 
constant as both the internal and external political situation changed so rapidly. The 
flexibility on the behalf of IDRC was much appreciated and new ideas such as looking 
 
10 Interview with Institute of Law team, Ramallah 17.07.2008 
11 Second Interim Technical Report, Informal Justice: The Rule of Law and Dispute Resolution in 
Post-Oslo Palestine,  




at the future of Palestinian democracy vis-à-vis the interaction between Fatah-Hamas 
by combining the two projects was well received13. 
The unforeseen split between Fatah and Hamas starting with the Parliamentary 
elections in January 2006 also had an effect on how ICPH was carrying out their field 
interviews for PACT. In some communities it became difficult to get adequate 
representation to the community focus groups as they would either be predominantly 
Fatah members or predominantly Hamas. Surveying therefore became the most 
reliable tool. In order for people to feel comfortable with the surveyors, the CBR 
workers who had been present in the communities for many years would carry out the 
surveys on the behalf of the ICPH team where possible. The team also mentioned, 
however, that being from Birzeit University opened many doors as Birzeit is 
considered impartial.14 
Timing and sustainability 
Due to the nature of the protracted conflict in Palestine where unpredictability is the 
only certainty, timing will almost never be reliable. Negotiations that are happening 
one day might be called off the next and a couple months of apparent calm can 
suddenly turn into war. The importance is to be present for when that window of 
opportunity to affect change arises.  
The decision by PCD not to stop supporting research in Palestine throughout the 
sustained conflict since the start of the second intifada reflects its policy for the entire 
period over which it worked in the region. This and the willingness of IDRC staff to 
regularly travel to Palestine despite heightened tensions was repeatedly mentioned by 
the partners as a unique feature of IDRC’s approach, and has greatly contributed to 
building and sustaining relationships of mutual trust with the Palestinian partners.  
It is clear that the selection of partners has been key in sustaining the programming 
through the more difficult times. All the partners have solid research capacity and are 
staffed and run by some of the best researchers in the country. They are well 
established and well funded institutions that young researchers strive to work with, 
thereby ensuring low turn-over of staff15. There is also a history with certain partners 
or Team Leaders (such as PSR and Birzeit University) which has added to the 
confidence of PCD staff regarding the sustainability of both the institutes and the 
individual projects in Palestine despite the occupation and the internal political 
turmoil16. 
Security risks 
All of the partners admitted to some sort of risk for researchers and field workers 
always being present in Palestine due to the nature of the occupation. Even when 
working in areas where the conflict might not be very intense, one can always be at 
 
13 Telephone interview with PCR Team Member 26.07.08 
14 Interview with ICPH team, 29.07.2008 
15 Interview with Pam Scholey, 30.10.08 




the wrong place in the wrong time. However, common sense is applied in all field 
operations and surveying on days of particular unrest may be postponed. 
As all of the projects deal with sensitive data, there exists a possible ethical risk as to 
the security of the information. Whereas all partners assured the writer that anonymity 
of respondents and confidentiality of the data was always ensured by storing it safely, 
PSR admitted that surveying attracts a lot of attention, and that this may in some cases 
leave both the surveyor and the respondents rather exposed, but that this was the 
nature of the research. Analyzing leadership transition dynamics in an unstable 
political situation is risky. However, according to the team leader, the researchers have 
been chosen because of their experience with, and access to, young guard leaders. 
That and the reputation of the PSR for independent policy analysis mitigate this risk.17 
Regarding the Hamas project, when prodded about the potential dangers of a mapping 
of roles and hierarchy within the very secretive Hamas movement getting into the 
wrong hands, such as the Israeli military, this had apparently not been considered and 
was at the time dismissed as not relevant.18  
In terms of risk to the research participants, IoL admitted to some level of self-
limitation in the topics explored in the Rule of Law project to minimize this risk. For 
example, cases of honor killings and killings of collaborators were consciously 
excluded from the research due to the very sensitive nature of the subject matter. 
Including these two topics in the research and fully pursuing such cases could have put 
both the respondents and the researchers in danger.19 
All of the respondents agreed that there is no risk to the partners or research 
participants from the government as Palestine still is democratic enough to allow 
criticism of its leaders. All the partners and Team Leaders are also well respected and 
well known members of Palestinian society and considered to be able to speak with 
authority on their subjects of expertise. In addition, they all have extensive networks 
of high level contacts both within Palestine and abroad that arguably serve as a shield 
from any possible backlash by political entities.  
It is important to note that local sense of risk is often very different to that of an 
external observer who is not used to the context. Palestinian researchers would 
therefore often go about their regular activities as long as it was by any means possible 
and not an obviously life-threatening situation. The doubled length of a drive due to a 
new flying checkpoint might be a more likely reason for postponing a field visit than 
the risk of being caught in the midst of an Israeli Army raid. Whilst it is important to 
ensure the security of all research staff members on PCD-supported projects, it is also 
equally important to trust that the partners know what they are doing and allow them 




17 Telephone interview with Khalil Shikaki, 26.07.2008 
18 Interview with PSR team, 27.07.2008 




3.2 On "What Happened" – The Partners and PCD's Intents and 
Achievements 
PCD-supported research is aimed to influence policy, build research capacities and to 
increase domestic ownership for the peace process. The 4 projects address these goals 
in different ways and to a varying degree.  
Project theory of change 
The PCD partners in Palestine are all well placed to influence policy. They are led by 
respected academics who all have easy access to policy makers because of their 
personal relations and because of proximity – all the partners are based in Ramallah 
where most of the Palestinian decision makers sit. However, not all the partners 
agreed on the role of PCD partners to implicitly try to influence policy makers. 
PSR as an organisation is highly connected within Palestinian society as well as 
abroad and can reach, in terms of audience, the prime minister or the president of the 
PA. The organisation is well respected across the political factions and is seen as a 
‘neutral’ commentator. The PSR team therefore considered policy relevance a given in 
their field and informing and influencing policy one of the objectives of the research 
they conduct. Similarly for ICPH, policy relevance was also not an issue. They have 
worked together with the Ministry of Health, Education, international and local NGOs 
for many years on mental health related issues and the researchers and the current and 
former team leader lobby actively and successfully for policy change and 
development. 
However, IoL struggled with the IDRC understanding of what policy influence meant. 
The Rule of Law project aimed ‘to strengthen the rule of law in Palestine through 
analyzing the current relationship between formal and tribal justice in the post-Oslo 
legal system and developing the necessary policy directives for future institutional 
reform’20. The project intended to achieve this by publishing a document outlining the 
current shape of the Palestinian legal system, and by drafting a set of policy proposals 
containing system reform advice. These findings and the policy proposals were then 
disseminated in a policy workshop for policy makers and the public. In discussions 
with IoL, it was raised that IDRC did not find this sufficient in terms of trying to 
influence policy by involving further PA officials and members of the Palestinian 
Legislative Council. However, the team felt that it is not the job of academics to lobby 
politicians. Quite the contrary – they should stay impartial. The preferred theory of 
change for the project was more ‘natural’; once the project was finished and the results 
of the research published the people involved would feel exposed. This would allow 
for some level of checks and balances. The IoL team argues that debate about certain 
topics in society creates change. It is admittedly a slower process of policy influence, 
but more sustainable as there is more ownership from the people.21 
This is an interesting point, especially as the subject matter is the relationship between 
formal and informal components of the Palestinian judiciary, which are so entrenched 
 
20 101610 Project Approval Document 




in Palestinian society. The argument is that for there to be true judicial reform in 
Palestine, a buy-in on the political level is not sufficient. What is needed is social 
change. Therefore, open debate about the issues in the society are necessary in order 
for any judiciary reform to take place, or for indeed, rule of law can be imposed 
effectively by the PA. Whereas IDRC was flexible enough to let the IoL team “step 
back” to solidly ground the project in appropriate conceptual approaches, there was a 
strong push for the IoL to produce practical policy recommendations. The team felt 
that IDRC needs to be more flexible with what it calls ‘policy research’ as having to 
‘frame’ research questions around policy relevance and ‘hot topics’ led to other, 
potentially important, topics being missed out.  
When programming in Palestine, it is worth considering what is meant by ‘policy 
influence’, especially in the current situation where the government is not 
democratically elected and not representative of the Palestinian population, therefore 
making legitimate reform initiated by this specific government very difficult. In 
addition, the Palestinian Legislative Council has not been functional since the fall of 
the short-lived Unity Government in June 2007. ‘Policy influence’, in the way IDRC 
understands it, might not be relevant for all projects in the Palestinian context.   
Methodology and conflict context 
In an environment such as occupied Palestine where the conflict dynamics constantly 
change, flexibility of the approach and the ability to adapt to a given situation is 
crucial for the success of any research program. Often it is impossible to know how 
certain situations will develop from one week to another. However, the researchers 
involved in the projects are all familiar with programming in this environment and 
methodologies were therefore adapted, where possible, to context changes whenever 
necessary. The Hamas project required a lot of resourcefulness from the PSR team in 
order to get the information needed. As interviewing leading Hamas members from 
the West Bank has become impossible due to their imprisonment by Israel, the team 
has resorted to scrutinizing articles in the Rizala newspaper, published by Hamas, on a 
daily basis in order to try to understand the structure of the organization and who is 
running the show in the West Bank22.  
The Young Guards project has been very affected by the changing context and the 
findings are yet to be published despite the project having officially finished in 2007.  
The original proposal aimed to focus around the Sixth Fatah Congress in July 2005 
around which PSR was to conduct research, stimulate informed policy discussions 
about Fatah`s future, produce policy papers, and have them widely disseminated 
among decision-makers within Fatah`s ranks. It was also foreseen that PSR would 
monitor and assess the implementation of policy reforms in the aftermath of the Sixth 
Congress.23 However, due to the internal political turmoil since the death of President 
Arafat, Fatah has still to date not held its 6th Convention. Assuming that the 
convention would be held at some point, the project was modified to feed into the 
convention by carrying out the study of the young guard in the meanwhile and 
 
22 Interview with PSR team, 27.07.2008 




publishing just prior to the convention for maximum impact. As there still has been no 
convention, the research remains unpublished. Although PCD had been flexible and 
supportive with the methodological changes throughout, PRS strongly believes that 
publishing at the wrong moment just because of a project deadline would waste 3 
years worth of hard work. There has still been some impact, through discussions and 
deliberations with the different groups of actors, but not as originally hoped.24     
The PACT project, throughout all its phases, has tailored the methodology to the 
specific context of Palestine. For example, a participatory research methodology was 
adopted, in which youth and those connected to them, such as families, teachers and 
counselors are incorporated into the research design through focus groups and 
workshops. Bringing in other stakeholders reduces the stigma attached to mental 
health issues and integrates psycho-social intervention strategies within the 
community, which is important in order to address the cumulative effects of exposure 
to violence.25  
Each phase of PACT has been designed based on revelations and lessons learnt from 
the previous phase meaning that the methodology used has constantly been adapted to 
the changing context. For example, the decision to partner with CBR teams was made 
after the realization that as an academic institution in a conflict setting, ICPH was 
limited in how far it could go to implement the findings and recommendations of 
PACT Phase I on the ground. In addition, all researchers on the PACT project know 
the communities covered by the project very well and understand their coping 
strategies. This is important in order to get people under high levels of distress to open 
up using the right approach. However, the team admitted that as they are so used to the 
ongoing violence, sometimes they do not see how bad things really are. For this reason 
having an external partner like SPEG at Queen’s University is crucial as it allows for 
checks and balances26. 
PCD team members have been involved in the methodological discussions of all the 
projects and all the partners were grateful for this support and found it very useful. It 
was expressed that PCD support (and MEGGF in the case of the Hamas project)  at 
the proposal development stage was particularly helpful as it was sometimes difficult 
to understand exactly how to tailor the projects to fit IDRC priorities. 
       
 
Capacity building 
In terms of capacity development, the most likely capacity to be developed is that of 
junior researchers working for the projects as all of the partner institutes and all the 
team leaders and lead researchers are well established and well known within 
Palestinian society. These ‘usual suspects’ will always have a sea of young researchers 
 
24 Telephone interview with Khalil Shikaki, 26.07.2008  
25 101323 Project approval document 




wanting to join their research teams. There is therefore a capacity building element in 
all of the projects, although not all of them necessarily planned for. 
Rule of Law had a strong, initially unforeseen, capacity-building element for junior 
researchers in the Faculty of Law at Birzeit University.  A team of interdisciplinary 
junior researchers was assembled to take part in the research, and they were involved 
in all phases of the project from design, to field work, analysis, presentation of results 
to stakeholders, and drafting of final report.  Some of the junior researchers have since 
remained at IoL and are working on subsequent research projects.27  In addition, IoL 
made use of some remaining funds – and a time extension from IDRC – to establish a 
Law and Society Unit within IoL at Birzeit University.  It is the first research unit of 
its kind at an Arab university and they are now delivering course as part of the 
curriculum at IoL.28 
The PACT project has through its three phases continued to ‘develop innovative 
methodological practice of understanding and intervening on both individual and 
communal experiences of trauma’29. The programme has also empowered and built 
the capacity of the CBR team to assist the community in responding to their psycho-
social needs and problems who in turn have empowered the community members by 
raising their awareness of psycho-social issues and how to deal with them. In addition, 
ICPH has trained, and continues to train, several highly qualified undergraduate and 
graduate Palestinian public health researchers in both qualitative and quantitative 
research methodologies and analysis.30 It is also important to note that the ICPH team 
is entirely constructed of women. 
 
Both the PSR projects are staffed by professional researchers with social sciences 
backgrounds and years of experience.  
 
Capacities of individuals are being built across most of the projects, but as the 
institutional capacity is there in all of the 4 projects, the capacity building aspect for 
PCD-supported research is not as strong in Palestine as it is elsewhere. The partners 
are all very well established and they are all led by exceptionally bright and capable 
individuals who all have a strong and authoritative voice in their fields of expertise. 
They are also all based in Ramallah which makes policy influencing easier. Whereas 
this is arguably necessary for research to be carried out successfully in a dynamic 
conflict context as that of Palestine, and possibly for securing some degree of policy 
influence, it would be interesting to explore the option in the future of linking up with 
lesser known and perhaps less ‘obvious’ partners. This might also take PCD into other 
cities in the West Bank such as Nablus, Bethlehem and Hebron that all have 
Universities and independent institutes. This is especially true now that the violence 
and instability is not as prominent as it was in the years 2000-2004. 
 
 
27 Interview with IoL team, 24.07.2008 
28 Institute of Law website, accessed 28.10.2008 
29 104728 Project Approval Document 




Finally, there are no partners in Gaza. Admittedly a scoping mission would currently 
not be easy, but perhaps this could be investigated from Ottawa and planned for when 
there is a period of lull and travel to Gaza would be possible. In terms of capacity 
building of research institutes and support in policy influence, it seems that Gaza is 
where it is most needed.  However, due to security concerns, IDRC staff have not been 
allowed to enter Gaza since 2004. 
 
Ethical challenges 
The issue of the ethical challenges of carrying out research in the Palestinian context 
did not seem to be a grave worry for any of the researchers interviewed. They 
admitted that there were some sensitive data collected, as in the case of Rule of Law  
and PACT, but that there was no risk of this data getting in to the wrong hands. Audio 
or camera equipment were not permitted, and anonymity and consent forms were 
always used. There was no specific coding of the data to keep it extra safe as this was 
not deemed necessary. 
Both PSR and IoL used workshops to discuss their findings prior to publishing in 
order to be aware of possible responses and therefore have the chance to omit anything 
that might be considered as too inflammatory. Workshops also allow those involved 
an opportunity to voice their concerns and an opportunity for recognition for those 
who so desire.31 It is also an opportunity to discuss the expectations of those involved 
in the research in terms of what it will achieve and what, if any, are the possible 
benefits for the respondents. Managing expectations is important as the understanding 
of the limits of a research project is not always clear. This aspect is omitted from the 
project planning phase and the methodology in all of the projects covered by this study 
and seems to be dealt with on a more ad hoc basis, if dealt with at all, especially as 
little backlash from unmet expectations is expected. PSR admitted that there was a lot 
of expectations from the Fatah young guard regarding the outcome of the research 
when they started, especially as some of the researchers were recruited from the young 
guards in order to guarantee access. The potential for outbreaks of violence is a risk 
associated with the local context; however, the team stressed that PSR is experienced 
in conducting research and carrying out surveys under difficult circumstances, and that 
it enjoys widespread support and respect among Palestinians.  
  




An interesting feature of the Palestine programme of PCD is that IDRC has a long 
history of programming there and many of the Palestinian researchers involved in the 
projects covered by this study have been known to IDRC staff for many years and 
some have worked on IDRC supported projects in the past. There is therefore a solid 
 




base on which to develop new projects and partnerships. In addition, IDRC’s decision 
to continue programming even during periods of sustained conflict has provided it 
with a very strong reputation in the region and has allowed it to maintain a respectable 
name throughout. 
 
In terms of the PCD programming considerations for engagement in pre-conflict, 
conflict and post-conflict setting, Palestine ‘ticks’ all the boxes. There is a very 
capable community of researchers and academic freedom and, thanks to a very limited 
political circle clustered in and around Ramallah, access to policy makers is easy. 
 
However, whereas IDRC is seen as wanting to engage local actors to change local 
conditions and always remaining at arm’s length from the Canadian government, two 
of the partners mentioned that IDRC now seems less flexible than in the past in terms 
of Canadian foreign policy priorities.  
 
The PSR team felt that the Hamas programme encountered problems due to policy 
change in Ottawa.32 The funding management of the project had to be very carefully 
conducted in order to ensure that no member of Hamas could benefit from the 
MEGGF and PCD funds. This meant that additional funding had to be sought in order 
to organise workshops where transport and lunch for the participants was covered by 
the project.33 This had come as a surprise to the team as it had been understood that in 
the past, IDRC decisions regarding their programming had largely been independent 
from the Canadian government. 
 
The IoL team noted that the language in the contract was now more political and that a 
further shift away from funding ‘pure’ research had been made in the past few years. 
This was worrying as centres such as the IoL rely on donors such as the IDRC. 
 
It is important to consider the implications a change in policy will have on the strong 
reputation of IDRC in Palestine as this could significantly affect future programming 




In a context such as Palestine it is safe to bet on timelines hardly ever holding. If it is 
not the conflict holding up work, it might be the olive picking season, Eid, weddings 
or school exams. While it was noted by all the partners that IDRC timelines are fairly 
flexible, it was also noted that additional funding was difficult to secure. The two 
approaches were considered somewhat contradictory as an extension in time would 
make little difference if there were no funds to keep on the staff for another 6 months. 
ICPH admitted that the 2 year project cycle which is not automatically renewable was 
very labour intensive for them and was not convenient in terms of long-term capacity 
 
32 Emma Naughton notes that this was directly related to recent Anti-Terror Legislation here in 
Canada, by which IDRC must abide,, but not related to any other policy changes at the IDRC 
level. 




building of the institution. It was underlined that PACT is a programme, not a series of 
projects. Vulnerabilities regarding being an all female team were also raised as 
pregnancies and children’s illness delay the work and there is no provision by IDRC to 




It is encouraging to notice with what care PCD programme officers have been 
recruited and the case for the Programme Officers for the Middle East is a true 
testament to this careful process. All the PCD staff that have been involved with the 4 
research projects were praised by the partners as very well aware of realities on the 
ground in Palestine. The former and current programme officers have both lived and 
worked in Palestine before joining PCD and it is clear that they understand the local 
context and the way the society functions.35 This is no doubt one of the reasons behind 
the successful and lasting partnerships that have been developed and the ensuing 
strong research proposals. There is a personal commitment to uphold relations and to 
deepen the impact of PCD-supported research. The current programme officer can 
support the partners on a methodological and academic level, but also on a human 
level as there is a profound understanding of the context in which the partners carry 
out their work. It was noted that this is not always the case with other donors and 




There was nothing groundbreaking about the programming modalities in Palestine. 
Two of the projects covered were carried out by institutes within Birzeit University 
and the other two by a well known independent survey institute. 
 
ICPH was already working together with Queen’s University when the PACT I 
proposal was written so that was a natural partnership initiated by the partner. It was 
very useful, especially during PACT II as Queen’s had more leeway to contract CBR 
workers than Birzeit had. However, those administrative issues were solved by the 
time PACT III was approved and at this final stage team members at Queen's are only 
taking advisory roles through consultancies. However, as stated before, the ICPH team 
admitted that it is very useful to have an external partner for checks and balances as 
Palestinian researchers might sometimes miss something because they are so 
desensitised to the conflict situation. 
 
For the Young Guards project, PSR aimed for the research process itself to bring 
about change within Fatah by using Fatah young guards as researchers. The 
methodology was very interesting but it had to be reconsidered as the Fatah 6th 
Convention never materialized. A gender balance in the team was not achieved despite 
initial promises to recruit a female researcher.  Rule of Law had a team composed of 
legal experts and social scientists and trained a number of junior researchers.  
 
34 Interview with ICPH team, 29.07.2008 





Due to the security concerns, PCD staff must obtain permission to travel to Palestine. 
At the height of the conflict, between 2000 and 2004, it was not always possible to 
visit the partners and follow-up with the projects regularly. Because of this limited 
monitoring and evaluation possibility, the selection of partners in Palestine has been 
so important. This is probably also why the partners selected are only a handful of 
well established research institutes with a solid track record and capacity enough to 
work through moments of crises – the ‘usual suspects’. 
 
 
3.4 Forward Thinking 
Flexibility 
Throughout the discussions with the researchers involved in the PCD-supported 
projects in Palestine, flexibility in terms of deadlines, project scope and methodologies 
used was underlined as most important when supporting research in conflict settings. 
The correct timing of dissemination and publication is often crucial in order to be able 
to influence policy in an unstable environment. Dissemination at an inopportune 
moment could go unnoticed and waste years of work, or alternatively, be very 
inflammatory and waste an opportunity to affect change. This is something that PCD 
has to consider when setting deadlines for projects. Bureaucratic and administrative 
needs in Ottawa must be balanced with realities on the ground.   
PCD context knowledge 
In order to roll out a successful research support programme in a conflict setting, the 
necessity for extensive first-hand knowledge of the country and the nature of the 
conflict cannot be more stressed. Identifying and developing partnerships and building 
trust in a context such as Palestine takes time and some of the partners need months if 
not years of courting before a joint project can be found.36 The project officer for a 
conflict country/region must really have their ‘finger on the pulse’ to be able to 
understand the way the partners work and to support a successful programme. 
If the knowledge of the local context is good everything from understanding the 
project budget lines to knowing how long it takes to get from one project site to 
another helps immensely if a rapid response to a methodological concern arises due to 
a sudden change in the context. This rapidity in response is important for the partner to 
be able to continue with the research in a seamless manner despite the change in the 
conflict dynamic. 
Opportunities      
What would have been interesting to see are some of the Palestinian projects linking 
up with other PCD projects in other countries. Not only would it allow researchers 
 
36 Project completion note, Young Guards, Emma Naughton. 
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from different conflict settings to share and compare experiences of working in 
conflict contexts, but it would also allow for a more comparative approach of the 
different disciplines covered. For example, the Rule of Law project could have 
benefitted from the experiences of the Northern Uganda team of the Generational 
Analysis of Armed Conflict, Peace and Justice Processes, and Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration project as they are also looking into how to 
reconcile the tribal justice system with the formal judiciary in Uganda. There are 
probably many more PCD supported projects with similar parallels that could 





Finally, in order to maximize institutional capacity building, it would be possible to 
design projects that would link some of the very strong partners with new, upcoming 
partners that do not necessarily have the institutional capacity to run PCD-supported 
research projects on their own. In Palestine, this would not only allow PCD to explore 
new, less ‘obvious’ partners, and therefore gain access to a new set of researchers, but 
also to expand geographically into other cities in Palestine. Although it is true that 
much of the capacity when it comes to research is concentrated in and around 
Ramallah, it is worth at least exploring other institutions around the West Bank and 
ever more importantly, in the Gaza strip.  The practicalities and possible pitfalls of 
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4.2 Annex 2. The Palestinian Conflict Context 
 
During the period under review 2001-2008 a number of significant detrimental 
political developments have occurred in Palestine. These developments have had 
significant influence on socio-economic development, on the development of civil 
society and the humanitarian situation. 
The period under review has been divided into three phases: 
1) 2001 - 2006   The second Intifada 
2) Jan 2006 – June 2007  Governance crisis 
3) June 2007 – Dec 2007  Current situation 
 
1) 2001 - 2006: The second Intifada 
The failed Camp David talks between Arafat and Barak in the summer 2000 
ultimately led to the second Palestinian Intifada in late September 2000. Shortly 
hereafter Ariel Sharon from the Israel right-wing party Likud won the Israeli elections 
(January 2001), while George W. Bush took office in the US. With Sharon in power 
the bilateral talks with the Palestinians ended. The Israelis no longer had a partner for 
peace as Arafat - in the view of Sharon and the Israeli Government - now headed a 
‘terror regime’. They held this view due to more and more armed Palestinian 
resistance against the continued Israeli occupation. After 9/11, this discourse was 
strengthened. 
In contrast to the first Intifada of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the second Intifada 
expeditiously turned from a mass uprising, primarily consisting of youth throwing 
stones at the occupation forces, into a militarised conflict in which Palestinian gunmen 
equipped with rifles were up against the Israeli army with all its might. Also the 
various Palestinian factions – most notably Hamas and Islamic Jihad – began using 
suicide bombs with only brief intervals. These facts gave the Israeli government an 
‘excuse’ to retaliate with excessive force. Hence, in 2002 Israel re-invaded the 
autonomous Palestinian areas, and at the same time the decision by the Sharon 
government to erect a so-called “security-barrier” (also known as the Wall) between 
Israel and the Palestinian occupied territories was taken.  
The ICJ ruled in 2004 that ”the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the 
occupying power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East 
Jerusalem, and its associated regimes, are contrary to International Law”37 
As a result of the second Intifada, the PA more or less disintegrated as a consequence 
of the Israeli re-occupation of most parts of the West Bank, and the destruction of the 
PA infrastructure. What was left of the PA was struggling with attempts at reforming 
the PA, in order to make the Authority more transparent. This was done under 
 




pressure from the international donor community. The weakening of the PA during the 
first three or four years of the Intifada made the NGOs more important than during the 
times of negotiations (1993-2000). Also Hamas was rising during these years. 
In late 2004 Yasser Arafat died after having been isolated in his Ramallah 
headquarters for several years. Mahmoud Abbas became the new president after 
presidential elections in early 2005. However, less than 50 % of the voters showed up 
at the polls. Local elections were held and Hamas fared very well and clearly showed 
that the movement enjoyed significant popular support.  
In late 2005 the PA received full control of the Gaza Strip, as Sharon decided 
unilateral disengagement from the Strip, which resulted in the evacuation of some 
6000 Israeli settlers from the area.  
The international community reacted to the intensified crisis by launching the Road 
Map in order to salvage the peace process. The Road Map itself is a not a very precise 
plan38. The main idea of the plan states the need for creating an “independent, viable 
Palestinian state by the end of 2005,” side by side with Israel. The Road Map is 
divided into three phases, and resembles on most issues the Oslo process. It was 
adopted by the Quartet, consisting of America, Russia, the UN and the EU, as their 
common policy vis-à-vis the conflict. Due to the deterioration in the political and 
economic sphere, donor aid shifted from a focus on long-term development to 
emergency aid during the second Intifada, and the donor community to a large extend 
relied on UN agencies and civil society to take care of service provision. 
The consequences for the Palestinian civil population were severe. The measures 
taken by the Government of Israel in the oPt are felt by all Palestinians and affect all 
aspects of life around the clock. The decline of the Palestinian economy since the 
Intifada has left the per capita GDP at $ 1.129 in 2006.39 This is a third less than the 
pre-Intifada level. This decline was primarily a result of the intensification of Israeli 
closure policies, which led to almost economic standstill and lack of employment 
opportunities, not only in oPt but also for the large number of Palestinians formerly 
working in Israel. Social, geographic and economic fragmentation was the ensuing 
result. Another significant change was signs of increased conservatism, not only in 
Gaza but also on the West Bank. 
3) Jan 2006 – June 2007: Governance crisis 
In January 2006 the Palestinians held legislative elections. To the surprise of most 
observers Hamas won. This electoral victory led to further deterioration as the 
consequence of the democratic election led to an international boycott of the PA now 
controlled by Hamas. 
Hamas had difficulties in setting up a new government as they attempted to establish a 
National Unity Government from the beginning. Initially they did not succeed. Only 
after experiencing fierce fighting between Fatah and Hamas in Gaza during late 2006 
more serious negotiations took place in order to find peaceful means of solving the 
 
38 For the full text of the Road Map, see http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm 




internal Palestinian discord. In March 2007 Fatah and Hamas – after Saudi Arabian 
mediation – signed an agreement and decided to establish the first Palestinian National 
Unity Government. However, its life span was brief and in June new internal 
Palestinian fighting causing at least 300 deaths and more than 700 wounded broke out 
in the Gaza Strip. The result gave Hamas complete control over the Gaza Strip, while 
Fatah was in control of the West Bank. Apart from the strife between Fatah and 
Hamas, the victory of Hamas also made the rifts within the Fatah movement much 
more evident.  
Economically the period was characterized by total collapse. The Hamas controlled 
PA did not have the economic means to pay salaries for the PA employees, which 
among other things led to numerous strikes. The increase in the Israeli closure policies 
and expansion of settlements led to a complete standstill in the Palestinian economy. 
Today more than 460.000 Israeli settlers live on the West Bank (incl. Occupied East 
Jerusalem). Construction is ongoing in at least 88 settlements.40  
The boycott of Hamas did not cause the donor community to stop aid to the 
Palestinians, but it was disbursed through a new mechanism called Temporary 
International Mechanism (TIM)41, or directly through the office of the Palestinian 
President Mahmoud Abbas. In fact, the international donor community distributed 
more aid than ever.  
In terms of the conflict between Israel and Palestinians the period witnessed a large 
number of Israeli incursions especially in the Northern West Bank and Gaza. 
4) June 2007 – Dec 2007: Current situation 
The internal Palestinian fighting in June 2007 led to the existence of two parallel 
Palestinian governments: one led by Hamas in Gaza and a new “caretaker” 
government recognized by the West led by Salam Fayyad in the West Bank. The 
existence of a new secular government in the West Bank also led to the resumption of 
bilateral talks, which was intensified in November 2007 after the United States 
initiated the Annapolis conference. However, so far no clear signs of a breakthrough 
are visible. The Gaza Strip is completely sealed off, and the expansion of settlements 
in the West Bank continues, as does the construction of the Wall.  
The donor aid community currently focuses on state- and institution-building by 
giving significant budget support to the PA (in Ramallah), while only emergency aid 
is coming in to Gaza.  
According to the World Bank the most severe aspect of the Palestinian economy is its 
changing composition. Today the GDP is increasingly driven by government and 
private consumption from remittances and foreign donor aid. Investment in the private 
sector hardly exists, leaving only little productive basis for the future. Due to the 
existence of the settlements, the closure regimes, the construction of the Separation 
 
40 Peace Now, 2007. 
41 While the TIM was capable of providing much needed assistance to some of the poorest Palestinians, it 
has been unable to prevent the decline in the humanitarian situation. 
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Barrier, the lack of freedom of movement and lack of control over external borders all 
economic development is stifled.  
In addition to the economic fragmentation, the social fabric is increasingly fragmented 
as well. At the same time the conflict between Fatah and Hamas remains unresolved 
as is the case with the rifts within Fatah.  
29 
 
4.3 Annex 3. List of people interviewed 
 
Name Research Project 
(if relevant) 
Institution  Contact details 
Emma Naughton PCD IDRC  
Pamela Scholey -   
Mudar Kassis Rule of Law IoL  
Lisa Taraki Rule of Law IoL  
Feras Melhem Rule of Law IoL  
Iman Bayuk Rule of Law IoL  
Khalil Shikaki Young Guards PSR  
Mahmoud Jaraba Hamas PSR  
Alaa Lahloh Hamas PSR  
Jehad Harb Young Guards PSR  
Waleed 
Ladadweh 
Young Guards PSR  
Rita Giacaman PACT ICPH  
Yoke van der 
Meulen-Rabaia 
PACT ICPH  
Suzan Mitwalli PACT ICPH  
Suha Qasem PACT ICPH  
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12. 101610 Between State and Tribe: The Rule of Law and Dispute Settlement in 
Post-Oslo 
 PAD, PP, 1-3 Interim Reports, First and Final Narrative Report, PCR, Trip 
Reports 
 
13. 102990 Strategic Consequences of Palestinian Divisions  
 PAD, PP, First Tech Report, PCR, Trip Reports 
 
14. 103849 Integrating Islamist Militants into the Political Process 
 PAD, PP, Trip Reports 
 
15. 101323, 103302, 104728 Palestinian Adolescents Coping with Trauma PACT 
(Phases I, II, III) 
 101323: PAD, PP, PCR, First and Last Technical Report 
 103302: PAD, PP  
 104728: PAD, PP  





4.5 Annex 5. Terms of Reference 
Evaluation of Peace, Conflict and Development (PCD) Research Support in 
Countries and Regions affected by Violent Conflict 
 
REVISED TERMS OF REFERENCE (April 2008)42 
 
1. Background: 
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC)’s Peace, Conflict and 
Development (PCD) program initiative has a long history of involvement in countries 
experiencing active violent conflict or war-to-peace transitions, including Guatemala, 
Colombia, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Sudan, Uganda, and South Africa. In many 
cases, PCD initiated programming during a time of war-to-peace transition, but the 
violent conflict did not always cease. In fact, PCD’s name change from 
“Peacebuilding and Reconstruction” in 2005 is a recognition that “the peace-to-
conflict is not linear, and frequently sees recidivism to violence and uneasy, unstable 
and partial peace”. Currently, PCD is  “programming in select contexts marked by 
armed violence (Palestine, Colombia), and will carefully consider engagement in 
additional such contexts”43.  
 
With this in mind, PCD wants to learn more on how PCD-supported research can be 
effectively conducted, managed and communicated in environments in which the 
effects of violent conflict have a significant impact upon the research process. This 
evaluation was first outlined in the 2005-2011 Prospectus. Also, the 2003 external 
review for the program initiative, then called Peacebuilding and Reconstruction 
(PBR), noted: “While the review found no research ethics problems in any of the 
projects reviewed, there is a need for PBR to develop guidelines, procedures, or 
“lessons-learned” addressing the particular ethical challenges of research 
programming in conflict-prone areas.”44 This evaluation will address some of those 
ethical challenges as well.  
 
This evaluation also reflects IDRC Centre-wide programming and policy. In recent 
years, IDRC has become increasingly concerned about reflecting on the complexities 
of supporting researchers and their research institutions in politically difficult 
environments, including contexts where there is unstable peace or risks of recidivism 
to political violence. In 2005, the Centre examined its involvement in countries in 
transition45. The transition study invited Centre staff to assess the prospects for change 
in transition contexts and to consider “the wider political, research and institutional 
environments […and] to think strategically on how changing contexts may impact 
programming and require responsiveness and flexibility”46. This concern is, in part, a 
 
42 The ToR have been adjusted following the methodological workshop that was held in 
Ottawa on the 29th and 30th of April 2008 with IDRC staff and Channel Research team. 
43 PCD Prospectus 2005-2011, p. 17. 
44 Brynen, Fox-Decent, and Brown, 2004 
45 Smyth, Nancy and Maggie Gorman (2005). Corporate Assessment Framework: Strategic Intelligence 
Performance Area “Understanding Local Realities in Countries in Transition”, Policy and Planning Group, 
IDRC.  
46 Ibid, p. 35 
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reflection of the Canadian Foreign Policy community’s increasing humanitarian, 
military and development assistance in conflict contexts and “fragile states”.   
 
This calls for more careful reflection on the conditions in which the diverse types of 
research support typically provided by IDRC is appropriate and viable, as well as 
determine how, when, and under what conditions PCD’s programming can extend to 
additional countries where conflict is ongoing. The broader topic of IDRC support of 
research in conflict settings will be explored as part of IDRC’s next environmental 
scan; and the PCD evaluation will feed into this Centre-wide discussion. The 
Evaluation of PCD Research Support in Countries affected by Violent Conflict will 
also explore questions of security and risk management to staff and project partners, 
which is a key concern for IDRC. Finally, the evaluation will explore some of the 
ethical issues involved in supporting peacebuilding research in violent conflict 
contexts. This evaluation should assist PCD in managing the tension between the need 
to be responsive in areas affected by violent conflict and being realistic in terms of 
both financial and human resources and political capital required.  
 
Principles and Approaches to Programming  
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is a public corporation 
created by the Parliament of Canada in 1970 to help developing countries use science 
and technology to find practical, long-term solutions to the social, economic, and 
environmental problems they face. Support is directed toward developing an 
indigenous research capacity to sustain policies and technologies that developing 
countries need to build healthier, more equitable, and more prosperous societies. 
In carrying out its mission, IDRC provides funds and expert advice to developing-
country researchers working to solve critical development problems. IDRC: 
 funds applied research by researchers from developing countries on the problems 
they identify as crucial to their communities. Most projects supported result from 
direct exchanges between the Centre and developing-country institutions;  
 provides expert advice to those researchers;  
 builds local capacity in developing countries to undertake research and innovate. 
 
Peace, Conflict and Development (PCD) is an IDRC program initiative which 
supports research for specific peacebuilding processes, as well as research on key 
peacebuilding challenges. PCD mainly responds to requests from research institutes, 
universities, policymakers, South-South and North-South networks, and civil society 
organizations. PCD encourages multidisciplinary approaches, encompassing 
economics, political science, anthropology, law, and social and gender analysis, as 
well as participatory/action research and other qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies.   
PCD aims: 
 to generate evidence-based findings that can be used to inform policy and 
programming decisions on root causes of violent conflict, the prevention of 
conflict, and equitable and sustainable development 
 To build domestic ownership of peace processes 
 To open spaces for discussion and dialogue  
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 To influence global policies and practices 
 To build capacity for more rigorous, methodologically creative, and collaborative 
research. 
 
2. Objectives:  
General Objective: 
The main objective of this evaluation is to identify the factors (conditions and 
programming modalities) that facilitate or hinder the research process for PCD-
supported projects in countries and regions affected by violent conflict, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of PCD programming modalities in achieving PCD 
objectives in those conflict settings.  
Specific Objectives: 
1. On the Conflict Context: Get a better understanding of what conditions 
(security, research infrastructure, community of researchers, etc.) need to be 
in place, especially when a return to violence seems imminent, so that 1) 
PCD can feasibly support research and 2) partners can feasibly conduct 
research in line with PCD’s program objectives.  
2. On “What Happened” - the Partners’ and PCD’s Intents and Achievements: 
Build a body of learning around the contributions PCD supported research 
can make in influencing policy, building research capacities, and increase 
domestic ownership of peace processes when taking into account the 
prevailing environmental conditions surrounding the research process and 
ethical considerations.  
3. On the “How”- Programming Modalities: Increase learning around the 
strengths and weaknesses of PCD programming modalities and its 
relationships to its research partners in contributing to the achievement of 
PCD objectives in countries and regions affected by violent conflict. 
4. Forward Thinking: With a better understanding of prevailing conditions, 
challenges and opportunities surrounding PCD supported research as well as 
PCD’s programming modalities: explore the implications (in terms of 
resources, security, institutional risks, policy influence, how we partner, 
etc.) of potential expansion of PCD programming into countries and regions 
affected by violent conflict.  
 
3. Users and Uses of the Strategic Evaluation: 
 
Primary Intended Users: 
 PCD program staff 
 
Secondary Users: 
 IDRC senior management and IDRC program staff 
 PCD’s partners 
 Other agencies/donors working in conflict contexts 
 
Uses 
PCD program staff can use the evaluation to: 
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 Learn how to improve its programming approach (project and program 
identification and development, programming modalities, monitoring, 
reporting and evaluation.) in contexts of active conflict where PCD already 
programs; 
 Build on previous and current programming experience to assess how, when, 
and under what conditions PCD could expand programming; 
 Identify PCD’s comparative advantage in supporting the management and 
dissemination of research in conflict contexts, including capacity building; 
 Assess how and when can PCD-supported research can influence policy, and 
what particular capacities PCD can/should be supporting in such 
environments; 
 Identify the ethical issues surrounding programming in conflict contexts, as 
well as assess security and risks for PCD staff and its project partners. 
 
IDRC senior management and other IDRC program staff can use the evaluation to: 
 Learn about programming in conflict contexts with a wide variety of 
programs, IDRC’s comparative advantages, and “lessons learned” from 
PCD’s experience; 
 Assess security and risks for IDRC staff and its project partners with any 
project in a conflict context; 
 Assess how IDRC can/should address the particular challenges of working in 
a conflict context, including risks to IDRC’s partner organizations, in 
particular when expanding programming into countries affected by violent 
conflict.  
 
PCD partners can use the evaluation to: 
 Increase their understanding of the value, utility and reach that research might 
have in contexts of conflict; 
 Assess the utility of different programming modalities and better understand 
the strengths and limitations of PCD; 
 Clarify PCD and IDRC’s role, and the expectations of what PCD and IDRC 
can and cannot do to support partners in conflict contexts. 
 
Other agencies/donors working in conflict contexts can use the evaluation for: 
 Reflection on their own programming in conflict contexts. 
 Get a better understanding of PCD’s comparative advantage in programming 
in countries and regions affected by conflict. 
 
4. Range of Issue and Evaluation Questions to be Considered  
 
Specific objective 1: On the Conflict Context 
Get a better understanding of what conditions (security, research capacity, 
institutional strength, ethical considerations etc.) need to be in place, especially when 
a return to violence seems imminent, so that 1) PCD can feasibly support research 




Lead questions: What kind of challenges and opportunities did the conflict context 
present to the research project? What kinds of dynamics were present at the political 
and institutional level? What were the capacities on the ground?  
 
Range of potential sub-questions: 
 What is/was the nature of the conflict context at the time of the research? Did 
PCD staff and/or partners conduct a conflict and/ or risk assessment as part of 
the project design process?  
 Was the timing of the research assessed in terms of the political context, the 
policy environment, etc.? 
 Did the conflict context change significantly during the course of the 
research? If so, did this affect the research process and how? 
 Was there an assessment of the sustainability of the project’s objectives and/or 
sustainability of the institution/network?  
 Did the research project encounter potential or actual ethical and/or security 
risks, including: risks to the researchers, including differential risks to team 
members in regions with varying levels of conflict, and interference or 
pressure by political or armed entities; risk to the research participants, 
including participants’ right to maintain anonymity, informed consent, the 
safe storing of data, and the use of tapes/filming.  
 Are there particular issues regarding institutional risks that are particular to 
conflict context, including institutional fragility, uncertain resource flow, 
excessive workloads, and staff turnover? How are these addressed by PCD 
and PCD’s partner organizations?  
 What kinds of challenges, if any, are present in getting country clearance for a 
project, and what is the effect on the research project? 
 
 
Specific objective 2: On “What Happened” - the Partners’ and PCD’s Intents and 
Achievements  
Build a body of learning around the ways in which PCD research partners adapt to 
the prevailing environmental conditions in conflict settings and address ethical 
considerations, and what contribution PCD-supported research can make in these 
conditions to influencing policy, building research capacities and increasing domestic 
ownership of peace processes. 
Lead questions: What did the research partners and PCD set out to do (intents)? What 
actually happened? Why did it happen that way? What were PCD and its partners’ 
coping strategies? In which ways did the research partners and PCD develop and adapt 
research questions, methodologies and approaches, capacity building and 
dissemination in a conflict setting? Are there particular strategies which where more 
successful? 
Range of potential sub-questions: 
 What kind of change in the environment is envisioned in the project (i.e. the 
project’s theory of change)? For example, would change occur through 
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individual change? Institutional change? By addressing root causes? By 
withdrawing resources for the conflict, etc? 
 How did the suggested research methodology take into account the conflict 
context? Was the methodology adapted or modified if the context changed? 
What is PCD’s role in developing the methodology? The research partners’ 
role? 
  Were there difficulties in accessing and collecting primary and secondary 
data? Did the research methodology include gender and/or generational 
analyses, multidisciplinary or comparative approaches, and/or worked with 
marginalized communities?  
 Were there risks highlighted (institutional, personal security, objectives maybe 
not attainable), and if so, in which ways were these handled by PCD and its 
partners?  
 During the course of conducting the research, what were the other practical, 
financial, political, methodological and ethical challenges related to the 
conflict context? These could include risks and challenges associated with 
potential unintended uses of research findings, for example.   
 Was there an aspect of capacity building (individual or institutional) build 
within the research project, and what was the research partners’ and PCD’s 
role in developing that capacity building element? 
 What has been PCD’s role in dealing with research ethics challenges from the 
outset of the project? How have ethical challenges (if present) affected the 
research process? 
 How was the research team composed? Has the conflict context affected the 
research composition? If it was composed of researchers both in and outside 
of the conflict context, was there a different level of risk between the 
researchers?  
 How was the research disseminated and communicated? Were policymakers 
part of the target group? What kinds of challenges and opportunities in 
dissemination and policy influence were present because of the conflict 
context? What political sensitivities existed, and how were those dealt with? 
 Were there unintended consequences of the research process? 
 
 
Specific objective 3:On the “How”- Programming Modalities: 
Increase learning around the strengths and weaknesses of PCD programming 
modalities and its relationships to its research partners in contributing to the 
achievement of PCD objectives in countries and regions affected by violent conflict. 
 
Lead questions:  What are the different programming decisions that PCD and its 
partners make regarding research taking into account a context of violent conflict? 
What modalities seem more successful, and under what conditions? What can PCD 
learn about this?  
Range of potential sub-questions: 
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 How do PCD criteria for involvement in conflict contexts fare in terms of 
feasibility and flexibility in conducting, managing and disseminating research, 
especially considering the potential “instabilities” in the context?  
 How does the research team assess the strengths and weaknesses of PCD’s 
programming approach?  
 What kind of programming modalities were considered and chosen by PCD 
partners and PCD staff (e.g. supporting an institution inside or outside of the 
conflict zone, composition of research team, research project vs. research 
support project, working in networks, capacity building, etc.). What 
adaptations have been/need to be made in design, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation of results? Does it differ from programming in any other 
contexts, and if so, how? What modalities seemed to be more successful, and 
under which circumstances? 
 To what extent did PCD partners and PCD staff act with flexibility and 
responsiveness under changing circumstances? What institutional tools, 
mechanisms or constraints (e.g. financial constraints, institutional policies, 
etc.) were taken into consideration? 
 During the course of managing the research, what practical, financial, 
political, methodological and ethical challenges came up? How were they 
dealt with? Are there particular strategies which where more successful? 
 
Specific objective 4: Forward Thinking 
With a better understanding of prevailing research conditions as well as PCD’s 
programming modalities, explore the implications (in terms of resources, security, 
institutional risks, policy influence, how we partner, etc.) of potential expansion of 
PCD programming into countries and regions affected by violent conflict. 
 
Lead questions:  What conclusions can be drawn from how external dimensions 
affect the research process? What are the manageable factors, through the partnership 
between PCD and its research partners? What are the strengths and weaknesses of 
PCD programming approaches to research in conflict settings? What lessons can be 
drawn in terms of the opportunities, challenges, and obstacles to potentially expanding 




The evaluation will consist of two components:  
 Four case studies that examine the challenges and opportunities of PCD’s 
programming in countries or regions affected by violent conflict; 
 A fifth paper consolidating case study findings and providing strategic 
forward planning on the feasibility of expanding PCD’s programming, both in 
countries where it already programs and in new countries/regions. 
       




Case study countries/regions are selected to reflect:  
 Significant recent PCD involvement: several projects ongoing or approved in 
those regions since the start of the 2005-2011 PCD Prospectus 
 Balanced geographic coverage to the extent possible 
 Selected case study countries/regions: Colombia, Palestine/Middle East, 
East Africa, and Sri Lanka   
  
Case study projects are selected based on: 
 Ongoing or approved in current Prospectus period 
 Research was managed or conducted, all or in part, in a country or region with 
violent conflict 
 Projects that present learning opportunities on the development, conduct, 
management and dissemination of research in conflict contexts 
 NOTE: A list of selected projects will be available to the selected consultants 
once hired 
 
Evaluation Methodology:  
The evaluation methodology and instruments will be developed in discussion with 
PCD staff and the consultants, and this will be the focus of a methodology workshop 
(to be held before the start of the evaluation – date TBD).  
 
Case study authors are expected to use qualitative methods as the primary source of 
data collection, including semi-structured interviews with staff, partners and 
beneficiaries. Document review of key project documents will also be critical to gain 
an in-depth understanding of the research problem and of PCD/PCD partners’ 
perceptions of how peace can best be supported through research. The case study 
methodology will include a desktop review of relevant project documentation, 
interviews with relevant PCD staff, project leaders and relevant stakeholders.   
 
A final workshop will bring together relevant project participants to discuss the draft 
report and exchange experiences and insights gained from conducting, managing and 






6. Roles and Responsibilities 
 
Consultants Will: 
 Be available for a Methodology workshop (before the beginning of the study, 
date TBD) and a Results workshop (date TBD, after the study is completed) 
in Ottawa  
 Develop and use high quality methods:  
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o Well done surveys, interviews that follow protocols, outputs that are 
insightful and well-written; these instruments/methods should be 
detailed in the workplan developed by the author for review by the 
evaluation manager.  
o Conduct all communications including interviews with respect for our 
partners and their work. 
 Produce high quality outputs: 
o Workplan (with instruments/methods, survey questions, etc.)  
o Iterative process with report draft 
o Full report and a short summary/brief of findings 
 Be resourceful: 
o Search for: 
 Additional documentation 
 Additional potential interviewees 
o Get general information on: 
 The case study organization 
 Its other donors 
 Its other projects 
 On capacity development and organizational capacity  
 
Evaluation Manager (PCD): 
 PCD will provide: 
o A list of case study project 
o An initial list of contacts and documents (Project Completion Reports, 
project proposals, etc.)  
o Support on travel logistics 
o Input on workplan and drafts of report 
o Background documentation  
 
7. Expected Outcomes and Outputs/Report Requirements for Complete 
Evaluation: 
 Participation of all consultants in a methodology workshop with PCD staff 
and other consultants (early 2008); 
 Four case studies, 20-25 pages in length each; 
 A 25-30-page paper to consolidate case study findings and provide strategic 
forward planning assessing the feasibility of expanding PCD’s programming, 
both in countries where it already programs and in new countries/regions. 
 A total of five briefs (2-4 pages each) on studies – one for each of the four 
case studies and a fifth summing up the findings of the consolidating/strategic 
planning paper; 
 Participation of all consultants in a results workshop with IDRC staff, project 




9. Estimated timeline and activities (in 2008 – dates TBD with availability of 
hired consultants): 
Case Study Authors (Per Case Study – 4 case studies total) 
 
Activity Timeline (by month from 
beginning of contract) 
Billable days per activity 
Methodology workshop 1st month Days, as follows:  
-1 day of workshop 
-1.5 days in transit 
Workplan  Submitted in 2nd month 2 days for workplan 
development 
Background research 2nd  month 3 days 
Field Work  3rd month 7 days, as follows: 
-5 days in field 
-2 days in transit 
Writing report and 
summary/brief 
3rd and/or 4th month 6 days 
Submission of report and 
brief/summary 
5th month   
Revision of report and 
brief/summary 
6th month 2 days 
Participation in results 
workshop and submit final 
report 
8th month 2.5 days, as follows:  
-1.5 days in transit,  
-1 day of workshop 
Total Billable Days per 
Case Study: 
                                                          25 days 
 
Author writing consolidating/strategic planning paper 
Activity Timeline (by month from 
beginning of contract) 
Billable days per activity 
Methodology workshop 1st month Days, as follows:  
-1 day of workshop 
-1.5 days in transit 
Workplan  Submitted in 5th month 3 days for workplan 
development 
Developing and Writing 
report and summary/brief 
5th and 6th month 20 days 
Submission of report and 
brief/summary 
End of 6th month    
Revision of report and 
brief/summary 
7th month 2 days 
Participation in results 
workshop and submit final 
report 
8th month 2.5 days, as follows:  
-1.5 days in transit,  
-1 day of workshop 




10. Quality of the Evaluation Report 
The quality of the evaluation report produced by the evaluators will be judged by 
IDRC’s Evaluation Unit on four internationally recognized standards: utility, 
feasibility, accuracy, and propriety. A copy of IDRC’s Evaluation Guideline 3  
“Formatting Evaluation Reports at IDRC” and Evaluation Guideline 4 “Quality 




4.6 Annex 6. Biography of the evaluator 
 
Annina Mattsson 
Mrs Annina Mattsson holds a Masters degree in Violence, Conflict and Development 
from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London, 
England. She has proven knowledge and hands-on experience of conflict and 
development settings as she has lived and worked in Ramallah in the Palestinian 
territories for 16 months. She has extensive research experience of the different issues 
development initiatives in conflict settings are faced with, especially in the Palestinian 
territories, having written her Masters thesis on the various aspects of donor funding 
present. As a consultant for Channel Research, she has taken part in studies and 
evaluations related to conflict, human rights and peacebuilding in the Middle East (for 
example in Palestine with the Swedish Agency for International Development (Sida)) 
and has been involved in a number of evaluations in active conflict settings such as 
Sudan and Sri Lanka. 
Mrs Mattsson is a Finnish national and speaks fluent Finnish, Swedish, English, 
Spanish and French, and can converse in colloquial Arabic. 
 
